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ADVICE AND CONSENT: ENSURING JUDICIAL FREEDOM
Patrick J. Leahy*
Throughout this nation's history, Americans have turned to the
Supreme Court to protect their rights against excesses of the legis-
lative and executive branches. To protect this crucial role of the
Court, the Framers realized that neither the executive nor the leg-
islature should have the power to cast the Court in its own image.
To prevent this usurpation of one branch by another, the Framers
wisely required the President to obtain the advice and consent of
the Senate in making appointments to the Supreme Court.
There has been significant debate recently about the proper role
the Senate should play in the advice and consent process. The
Constitution requires a vigorous, active role. Moreover, if the Pres-
ident gave greater credence to the process laid out in the Constitu-
tion, seeking the Senate's advice as well as its consent, I expect
that we would see a smoother process more satisfactory to our peo-
ple and resulting in better appointments to the Court.
The Framers viewed advice and consent as a powerful check on
the President's discretion in making appointments to the Supreme
Court. As Alexander Hamilton wrote:
In the act of nomination, [the President's] judgment alone would be
exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man, who
with the approbation of the Senate should fill an office, his responsi-
bility would be as complete as if he were to make the final
appointment.
To what purpose then require the cooperation of the Senate? I an-
swer, that ... [i]t would be an excellent check upon a spirit of fa-
voritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the ap-
pointment of unfit characters.'
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Indeed, until the very last days of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, drafts of the Constitution called for the Senate to have the
sole role in appointing Supreme Court justices. After certain dele-
gates objected that the Senate was too large to fulfill this duty ef-
fectively, a compromise was reached whereby the President and
the Senate would share responsibility for the appointment of Su-
preme Court justices.2
That shared responsibility has resulted in the rejection of several
nominees. As early as 1795, President Washington's nomination of
John Rutledge to be Chief Justice was rejected by the Senate be-
cause of Rutledge's opposition to the Jay Treaty.
While presidents may object to the Senate's participation in the
appointment process, the Constitution envisions co-equal roles for
the Senate and the President. For the Senate to do less is to abdi-
cate its constitutional duty to guarantee the independence of our
courts and the rights of our citizens.
2. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 498-99 (Max Ferrand ed.,
1966).
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